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Preface 
The 2013-2016 epidemic of Ebola virus disease in West Africa was of unprecedented 
magnitude and changed our perspective on this lethal but sporadically emerging virus. 
This outbreak also marked the beginning of large-scale real-time molecular epidemiology. 
Herein, we show how evolutionary analyses of Ebola virus genome sequences provided key 
insights into virus origins, evolution, and spread during the epidemic. We provide basic 
scientists, epidemiologists, medical practitioners, and other outbreak responders with an 
enhanced understanding of the utility and limitations of pathogen genomic sequencing. 
This will be crucially important in our attempts to track and control future infectious 
disease outbreaks.  
Introduction 
The 2013-2016 Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West Africa appears to have begun 
following human contact with an animal (likely bat) reservoir of Ebola virus (EBOV) in 
December 2013, in the small village of Meliandou in Guéckédou Prefecture, Guinea1. After this 
initial spill-over infection, the outbreak remained undetected for several months and spread via 
chains of sustained human-to-human transmission, with no evidence of additional zoonotic 
transfers from the animal reservoir1–4. By the time that EBOV (a lineage later named the Makona 
variant5) was confirmed in March 2014, several villages, towns, and larger cities had reported 
cases1. When the World Health Organization declared the EVD outbreak to constitute a Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern in August 20146, EBOV had already spread across 
country borders with more than a thousand cases reported in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
Nigeria. In the epidemic that followed, a total of 28,646 confirmed and suspected cases of EVD 
were documented, with 11,323 recorded deaths, making it by far the largest outbreak of EVD on 
record7. 
Ebola virus is a negative-sense single-strand RNA ((-)ssRNA) virus with a 19 kilobase genome, 
and like most other RNA viruses quickly generates mutations through error-prone replication. 
Until recently, genomic studies of infectious disease outbreaks were necessarily retrospective, 
occurring after the pathogen had either been eradicated or developed endemic transmission in the 
host population8–12. However, recent developments in high-throughput next generation 
sequencing (NGS)13–16 enabled rapid and in-depth viral genomic surveillance during the 2013-
2016 EVD epidemic1–3,17–26. Indeed, with the advent of NGS it is now possible to generate 
pathogen genomic data directly from diagnostic patient samples2,3,17–27 within days or hours of 
the sample being taken25,26, and in challenging field situations19,23,25,26. The resulting large-scale 
sequence data sets provide new opportunities for the epidemiological investigation of 
transmission chains and the improvement of outbreak responses28. In the case of the 2013-2016 
EVD epidemic, the sequence data generated have revealed key aspects of the patterns and 
processes of EBOV evolution as the epidemic proceeded2,3,20–22,24–26,29,30. Hence, not only was 
the 2013-2016 epidemic a landmark in the epidemiological history of EBOV, but the size of the 
resulting genomic data set - over 1,500 full-length EBOV Makona sequences (Table 1), or 
approximately 5% of those infected - also make it one of the most densely sampled infectious 
disease outbreaks (Fig. 1a, b). Although sequence data have been generated from outbreaks of 
viral disease for over 30 years8–12,31,32, the sheer size of the data set, the widespread spatial 
coverage (Fig. 1a), and the contemporary nature of the EBOV data provide the first in-depth 
genomic anatomy of an epidemic, setting a benchmark for future outbreak responses. In the 
following we illustrate how pathogen sequences produced during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic 
provided key insights into EBOV genomic epidemiology and molecular evolution, and note the 
lessons that need to be learned for the effective study of future outbreaks. 
Review 
Ebola virus disease in humans 
Ebola virus (species Zaire ebolavirus) is one of four viruses - with Sudan virus, Taï Forest virus, 
and Bundibugyo virus - within the genus Ebolavirus that cause severe disease in humans and 
other primates. The final member of the genus is Reston virus, although infection with this virus 
does not appear to cause human disease33. All ebolaviruses are members of the family 
Filoviridae, which also includes Lloviu cuevavirus (genus Cuevavirus) and the severe human 
pathogen Marburg virus (genus Marburgvirus). It is believed that bats serve as the primary 
reservoir for EBOV34,35. However, EBOV infections have only been confirmed in a small 
number of mammalian species and it is unclear whether the virus infects a wider range of animal 
hosts that have yet to be sampled. Some evidence for a broader host distribution, at least in the 
evolutionary past, comes from the observation that endogenous filoviruses are present in the 
genomes of diverse mammalian species, including marsupials36,37. 
Ebola virus disease in humans was first described in Zaire (now, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC)) in 1976, where, over a two-month period, it led to an outbreak of 318 cases with 
an 88% case-fatality rate (CFR)38 (although CFRs are difficult to estimate for EVD39,40, so 
should be interpreted with caution). Between 1977 and 2014, 12 smaller outbreaks were reported 
in Middle Africa, with 32 to 315 cases and CFRs ranging from 47% to 89%41. The 2013-2016 
EVD epidemic is therefore notable not only for its duration and magnitude, but also as the first 
outbreak in West Africa and the first where case exportations and nosocomial transmissions were 
reported outside of Africa41. However, despite the scale of the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic, 
infection with EBOV Makona appears to lead to similar disease characteristics and transmission 
profiles as previous EBOV outbreak variants42,43. For example, the CFR for the 2013-2016 EVD 
epidemic appears to be ~70%1,39,40,43 and estimates for the basic reproduction number (R0) fall 
between 1.5-2.5, both of which are comparable to calculations from previous outbreaks39,44–47. 
Origin of the 2013-2016 Ebola virus disease epidemic 
Evolutionary analyses of genome sequences from the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic have provided a 
clear picture of the origin and spread of EBOV Makona1–3,20–22,24–26,48. One of the most important 
early questions was whether the epidemic was the result of a single cross-species transmission 
event into humans, or whether there were repeated zoonotic events from a widespread animal 
EBOV reservoir. Due to the high genetic similarity of virus genomes sampled from the 
beginning of the epidemic, a single spill-over infection seems the most likely1,2. Phylogenetic 
analyses also make it clear that once the outbreak was established, later lineages of EBOV 
Makona have descended from those circulating earlier in the epidemic (Fig. 1c)2,3,20–22,24,25. This 
is in contrast to some of the earlier EVD outbreaks, in which epidemiological and sequence-
based investigations have provided evidence for multiple spill-over infections49,50. 
Sequence-based findings are consistent with epidemiological investigations into the timing of the 
2013-2016 EVD epidemic, which place the first case around late December 2013 in Guinea1. In 
particular, molecular clock dating analyses suggest that the common ancestor of all sequenced 
EBOV Makona lineages be placed at the beginning of 20142,21,48, with lineages in Guinea falling 
close to the root of the tree (Fig. 1c). These studies also showed that EBOV Makona diverged 
from other EBOV outbreak variants only about a decade ago2,48. This suggests that EBOV 
Makona may be fairly new to West Africa, sharing recent common ancestry with Middle African 
variants that are thousands of miles away. Molecular clock dating analyses have also shown that 
all recorded human EVD outbreaks caused by EBOV appear to share a common ancestor around 
19752,51. Strikingly, this is around the time of the first described EVD outbreak in 1976, 
suggesting that the EBOV lineage experienced a severe genetic bottleneck prior to the first 
human outbreak52,53. Despite their power54, molecular clock dating studies of this type would 
undoubtedly benefit from additional EBOV genomic sequence data from both previous EVD 
outbreaks and animal reservoir populations. 
Genetic diversification of Ebola virus Makona during the 2013-2016 epidemic 
Because of the relatively small magnitude and duration of previous EVD outbreaks, earlier 
EBOV sequencing efforts were necessarily limited to small numbers of temporally clustered 
cases. The data from these earlier studies largely comprised single viral lineages and led to the 
perception that EBOV genomes remain stable over the course of an outbreak55–59. However, the 
much larger size and duration of the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic (Fig. 1a, b) resulted in a different 
molecular epidemiological pattern for EBOV Makona, in which multiple virus lineages arose 
and co-circulated (Fig. 1c). 
Despite their shared border, the EBOV Makona genomes sampled from the three most affected 
countries - Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia - generally (although not exclusively) form 
separate clusters on phylogenetic trees and exhibit different phylogenetic patterns (Fig. 1b, c)3,19–
22,24–26. Genomic studies have shown that the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic was dominated by three 
major lineages, denoted ‘A’21,25, ‘SL2’2, and ‘SL3’2,3 (Fig. 1c). Most of these lineages - 
including lineage A21,25 in Guinea, SL3 in Sierra Leone3, and Liberian isolates24 - circulated 
locally, with only sporadic cross-border transmissions (Fig. 1c). In contrast, lineage SL22 has 
been the most widespread in the region (Fig. 1c)3,21,22,24,25. This lineage likely arose in Sierra 
Leone2 where it gave rise to lineage SL3 and several sub-lineages3,22. It crossed more than twice 
into Liberia24, seeded several transmission chains in Guinea21, and spread throughout Sierra 
Leone2,3,22 (Fig. 1c). It is unclear whether any of these lineages carry mutations that could have 
affected their epidemic potential60, or - perhaps more likely - whether the increased geographical 
spread of SL2 and SL3 is a reflection of chance epidemiological founding events (see later 
section below)60,61. 
Evolutionary dynamics of Ebola virus during the 2013-2016 epidemic 
Although the origin and spread of the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic seem well resolved1–3,20–22,24,25, 
other aspects of EBOV evolution during this epidemic have proven more controversial. A major 
point of contention in both scientific publications2,3,20–22,24,62–64 and the popular press65,66, has 
been whether the virus ‘mutated’ unusually rapidly during this outbreak. Unfortunately, much of 
this discussion is based on misrepresentations of what type of rate was measured and how these 
rates can be translated into predictions of phenotypic evolution. 
The starting point for the debate over how quickly EBOV Makona evolves was the observation 
by Gire et al. that the mean evolutionary rate early in the epidemic was ~1.9 x 10-3 [95% 
Bayesian credible interval: 1.11, 2.91 x 10-3] nucleotide substitutions per site, per year 
(subs/site/year)2. This rate was approximately twice as high as that averaged from genomic 
sequences of EBOV variantsa sampled from multiple outbreaks, at ~0.9 x 10-3 [0.81, 1.18 x 10-3] 
subs/site/year2. However, later studies of EBOV Makona consistently produced lower rate 
estimates than that generated by Gire et al.3,21,22,25. Indeed, taking the publicly available sequence 
data as a whole, estimates of the EBOV evolutionary rate for the 2013-2016 outbreak converge 
on a mean value of ~1.2 x 10-3 [1.13, 1.27 x 10-3] (Fig. 2). The ensuing discussions of whether 
EBOV is evolving more or less rapidly than expected, and what this means for the ability of the 
virus to evolve changes in transmissibility and virulence, have become a common narrative67–70. 
The debate over the evolutionary dynamics of EBOV highlights a number of general issues in 
viral evolution. First, estimates of evolutionary rate are generally expected to be higher within 
than between outbreaks. This is because the relatively short time-scale over which sequences are 
sampled during outbreaks may be insufficient for mutations to be removed (or less likely be 
fixed) by either natural selection or genetic drift. Hence, pathogen genomic sequences sampled 
early within epidemics will contain an excess of mildly deleterious variants that would 
eventually be eliminated by purifying selection61. This will tend to inflate evolutionary rates and 
in part explains why evolutionary rates in RNA viruses are often ‘time-dependent’: high toward 
the present, low toward the past71,72. Indeed, it is notable that as the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic 
progressed analyses of evolutionary rate in  EBOV converged on a reliable estimate  (Fig. 2), 
which is expected due to the increasing size of the data set combined with a longer sampling 
period. When viewed in the context of viruses as a whole, it is also striking that all the 
evolutionary rate estimates for EBOV fall in a narrow range towards the center of a distribution 
that spans more than three orders of magnitude, from ~10-2 to ~10-5 subs/site/year (Fig. 2). 
                                                
aEBOV outbreak variants are viral lineages responsible for human outbreaks. Other EBOV variants include EBOV 
Yambuku (Mayinga) from 1976, EBOV Kikwit from 1995, and EBOV Lomela from 2014 (DRC). The between-
outbreak evolutionary rate therefore reflects estimates averaged across all EBOV variants. 
As well as time-dependence, it is possible that purifying selection may be relaxed in humans 
following cross-species transmission and/or EBOV may undergo more replications per unit time 
during human outbreaks than in its reservoir species2,73. Both of these scenarios would increase 
the within-outbreak rate. Potential evidence for fundamental differences in evolutionary 
dynamics associated with species jumping is provided by the EBOV Lomela variant that 
emerged in the DRC during 2014, causing a small EVD outbreak with 69 cases74. The branch 
length on the EBOV phylogenetic tree leading to the EBOV Lomela sequences from their 
common ancestor is far shorter than expected from their sampling time in 2014 (Fig. 3a), 
indicating a markedly lower evolutionary rate74,75. This could reflect an evolutionary history in a 
different reservoir host to those previously described for EBOV, in which replication rates and 
hence evolutionary rates are reduced, or where purifying selection acts with greater potency than 
in humans. Intriguingly, lower EBOV evolutionary rates were also observed in suspected cases 
of transmission from human EVD survivors during the 2013-2016 epidemic (Fig. 3b)76,77. 
Unexpectedly low evolutionary rates may therefore serve as an important signal of transmissions 
from EVD survivors during flare-ups26,76 (Fig. 3b). 
The debate over EBOV evolutionary rate estimates has also revealed confusion over the 
terminologies used to describe the rate at which genetic changes accumulate. The most straight-
forward measure of the rate of molecular evolution is the nucleotide ‘substitution rate’, which 
describes the frequency that mutations are fixed in populations through time and for EBOV is 
best approximated by the rate observed between outbreaks (Box 1)61. This rate reflects the long-
term evolutionary process of selective constraints on the genome, host species-specific 
adaptation and the cumulative results of genetic drift. The rate of change within outbreaks might 
be better thought of as the ‘evolutionary rate’ as the short time-scale of sampling necessarily 
means that not all mutations observed will be fixed. Both the substitution rate and evolutionary 
rate can be clearly distinguished from the ‘mutation rate’. This term relates to the rate at which 
mutations are generated during viral replication by intrinsic biochemical factors, particularly 
how frequently the viral polymerase makes errors78 (Box 1). This rate is generally challenging to 
measure79,80 and is unknown for most viruses, including EBOV. It is therefore unfortunate that 
the debate over EBOV evolution has focused on ‘mutation’ (and hence potential differences 
intrinsic to particular virus lineages) when this is not the parameter that has been measured.  
Finally, it is too simplistic to think that a two-fold variation in rate estimates for EBOV will 
result in radically different evolutionary behavior, especially when seen in the context of RNA 
viruses as a whole (Fig. 2). The likelihood of meaningful adaptive evolution not only depends on 
the rate at which the virus is able to generate mutations, but also on those environmental and host 
factors that shape the selection pressures acting on the virus. That filoviruses have infected a 
wide range of mammalian hosts36,37,81 suggests that they are readily able to adapt to new 
environments irrespective of potential differences in evolutionary rate. 
Phenotypic evolution of Ebola virus during the 2013-2016 epidemic 
While the patterns of EBOV molecular evolution during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic have 
been well characterized, it is currently unknown whether any of the observed mutations have 
resulted in differences in viral phenotype - particularly with respect to such traits as antigenicity, 
transmissibility, and virulence - or could have an impact on vaccines, therapeutics and 
diagnostics. Although genomic sequence data play a central role in understanding outbreak 
dynamics and evolution, revealing key aspects of viral phenotype using sequence data alone is 
fraught with difficulties, and may even be counterproductive to outbreak response by steering 
focus away from more critical needs65. 
As the 2013-2016 West African epidemic of EVD was so much larger than previous outbreaks, it 
is possible that EBOV Makona possesses mutations that have enhanced its transmissibility in 
humans. Without direct experimental data, however, a simpler scenario is that the scale and 
severity of the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic reflects a different epidemiological context than 
previous outbreaks. Under this model, most - if not all - EBOV variants entering human 
populations following cross-species transmissions have the ability to cause major epidemics, but 
have been unable to do so because of a lack of susceptible host population and/or environment. 
In particular, previous EVD outbreaks occurred in largely isolated and rural areas41 (with the 
notable exception of the 1995 outbreak in Kikwit, which has a population of ~400,00041), where 
there were either an insufficient number of susceptibles to guarantee long-term transmission, or 
the outbreak was quickly controlled by efficient interventions. The 2013-2016 EVD epidemic, in 
contrast, was the first in West Africa and the first in which a large EVD epidemic resulted in 
sustained community transmission from rural settings to major urban centers, where it was easier 
to establish large-scale transmission networks. This included the establishment of ‘underground’ 
networks, amplified by reluctance in the affected communities, that greatly hindered intervention 
strategies focused on breaking chains of transmission. That the scale of the 2013-2016 EVD 
epidemic more reflects virus epidemiology rather than virus evolution is also supported by the 
failure to find evidence for heritable changes in the duration of virus shedding or virulence 
during the course of the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic39,40,42–47. 
However, it is also the case that EBOV evolution during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic is 
characterized by an abundance of nucleotide and amino acid sequence that could fuel adaptation 
for more efficient human transmission; any mutations that increased R0 would have been favored 
by natural selection. Because of its key role in virus-host interactions, most attention has been 
directed toward the EBOV glycoprotein (GP), and it is notable that the highest level of genetic 
amino acid diversity generated during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic occurred in the GP (in 
particular, its mucin-like domain)3,22. For example, we observed 104 amino acid changes in GP 
that are shared by at least two EBOV Makona lineages across the ~1,500 publicly available 
complete EBOV genomes that make up about 5% of the more than 28,000 reported EVD cases7. 
While it is not known whether any of these amino acid changes lead to functional differences, 
one plausibly important GP variant that originated early in the epidemic (in lineage SL2)24 is an 
Alanine to Valine change at residue 82 (A82V). This is the first substitution observed in the 
receptor binding domain of EBOV and could potentially alter the interaction between the EBOV 
GP and its host receptor NPC182,83. Clearly, determining whether lineages of EBOV Makona 
carrying A82V or other mutations that arose during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic differ in 
epidemic potential should be a research priority.  
Irrespective of potential differences in transmissibility yet to be uncovered, it is more certain that 
EBOV Makona is no different than previous EBOV outbreak variants when it comes to bodily 
fluids being the primary route of transmission81. Early on in the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic there 
was high-profile speculation that EBOV could evolve respiratory (i.e., airborne) transmission 
due to genetic diversity in the viral population62,64,65. However, there is no evidence for airborne 
EBOV transmission during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic - or any other EVD outbreaks - nor are 
there any examples of other viruses evolving a new mode of transmission on the time-scale of 
individual outbreaks. Although influenza virus shifts its mode of transmission from (primarily) 
fecal-oral in its wild bird reservoir to respiratory in humans84, this change occurs at the point of 
cross-species transmission and not during human outbreaks.  
While the occurrence of airborne transmission can be eliminated for EBOV, studies utilizing 
genomic sequence data have conclusively shown that sexual transmission plays a previously 
unappreciated role for EBOV dissemination and reignition77,85–88. However, the long-term 
epidemiological and evolutionary implications of this mode of transmission are unclear and 
warrant further in-depth studies. 
Public health implications of genomic epidemiology 
In addition to providing essential information on the pattern and dynamics of viral evolution 
during epidemics, viral genomic data may be of more direct public health importance. Indeed, 
the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic is arguably the first in which genomic data have been used 
directly in a real-time public health setting, helping to inform policies and infection 
control2,7,25,26. That some of these studies were undertaken under difficult field conditions19,23,25,26 
highlights the potential for portable genomic sequencing to transform outbreak responses7,25. 
The simplest use of genomic data during outbreaks has been to reveal the pathways of viral 
spread through communities; when combined with phylogeographic approaches22,89 the results 
can be used to direct intervention methods to transmission hot-spots and determine the impact of 
specific interventions such as border closures. For example, Tong and colleagues used viral 
genome sequencing to show how EBOV spread from the capital city of Freetown to multiple 
districts throughout Sierra Leone22, with Arias et al. later documenting how virus traffic from 
Freetown established new transmission clusters late in the epidemic26. Similarly, phylogenetic 
analyses revealed the co-circulation of multiple EBOV lineages within individual localities such 
as Conakry20, as well as cross-border virus traffic between Guinea and Sierra Leone25, 
highlighting important gaps in intervention. On a more localized epidemiological scale, genome 
sequence data provide a way to reveal who-infected-whom in EBOV transmission networks 
(although see below). Pathogen sequence data can therefore yield key information on the 
likelihood of, for example, sexual transmissions77,85–88, as well as the possible transmission of 
EBOV via breast milk26. A similarly precise reconstruction of transmission chains is essential in 
understanding the multiple reignition events that occurred during the EBOV epidemic and their 
relation to viral transmissions from EVD survivors (Fig. 3b)76. It is unclear whether the small 
subset of EVD survivors that harbor persistent infections pose a sustained infection risk or 
whether an episode of renewed viral replication is required for transmission to occur. 
Considering the pattern and degree of EBOV genetic change within such cases may provide 
critical insights. Phylogenetic approaches also provide a powerful way to accurately estimate 
various outbreak parameters, such as R0, including that for individual virus lineages that are slow 
and difficult to obtain using longitudinal case data90,91. Finally, the identification of virus ‘super 
spreaders’ within human populations can also be readily achieved based on pathogen sequence 
data92. 
Despite the quantity and quality of the viral genome sequence data generated during the 2013-
2016 EVD epidemic there are limitations to the scope and impact of genomic epidemiology. 
Clearly, the direct phenotypic effects of individual mutations on vaccines, and therapeutics, 
diagnostics need to be tested experimentally. However, should viral lineages that differ in such 
properties arise during outbreaks, evolutionary genomic analyses provide a powerful means to 
both determine their origins and rapidly track their spread through human populations. 
Lessons learned and future directions 
The 2013-2016 EVD epidemic has set the benchmark for the use of large-scale molecular 
epidemiology as an essential tool in outbreak response. Given the development of portable 
sequencing technologies, real-time viral genome sequencing is now viable in clinics and 
diagnostic laboratories, including in resource-limited settings25,93. This will offer critical 
information to inform epidemiological intervention, but will require a willingness to invest in 
scientific infrastructure, healthcare, and training of local staff in the affected countries94. The 
need for immediate analysis and the growth of open sharing of sequence data means the 
challenge in genomic studies may be moving from data acquisition to analysis and interpretation. 
However, it is also the case that in-country real-time sequencing was not established until 
relatively late in the West African epidemic19,23,25,26,93, when case numbers had already begun to 
decline. In addition, many of the genome sequences were obtained in the absence of strong 
clinical and epidemiological metadata, such as the precise geographical location from where the 
sample was obtained, whether the individual survived the infection, and the time to the onset of 
symptoms. While it may be difficult to obtain such data during a rapidly developing outbreak, 
this limits the usefulness of genomic sequencing data in addressing a number of central 
biological questions, such as the virological basis to any variation in disease presentation and the 
evolution of pathogen virulence. An important lesson for the study and management of future 
disease outbreaks is not only that portable sequencing platforms should be deployed as rapidly as 
possible, but that each sequence obtained should be linked to as much relevant metadata as is 
ethically and technically possible. 
Despite the insights provided by the analysis of EBOV genome data, it is also clear that major 
questions remain. For future outbreaks it will be important to resolve exact chains of 
transmission (i.e., who-infected-whom) as this provides vital information on the patterns and 
mechanisms of virus spread within single communities and hospitals, which will help target 
interventions. Sequence data from the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic indicated that these chains were 
difficult to infer using the population consensus sequences from individual hosts, although in 
several cases they were shown to be in agreement with epidemiological studies2,3,25. Hence, 
although EBOV evolves rapidly, mutations are not necessarily fixed at the scale of individual 
transmission events, which limits phylogenetic resolution. One solution is to examine the 
transmission patterns of intra-host single nucleotide variants (iSNVs)3. If multiple iSNVs are 
routinely transmitted between individuals (i.e., that EBOV is not subject to a severe population 
bottleneck at inter-host transmission) then tracking the inheritance patterns of these variants can 
provide information on how transmission patterns exist between individual hosts, as previously 
shown for influenza virus95,96. Importantly, it has been shown that significant intra-host variation 
can be observed for EBOV, with 2-5 iSNVs per infected patient typical when using a minor 
allele frequency cutoff of 5%2–4,26. As the cutoff is lowered, the numbers of observed iSNVs 
increase sharply2,3.  
Genomic studies undertaken in West Africa toward the end of the 2013-2016 EVD outbreak 
illustrated how iSNV data can help resolve EBOV transmission pathways. For example, Arias 
and colleagues showed how the analysis of iSNVs from EBOV patients in Sierra Leone can 
provide strong support for sexual transmission from EVD survivors26. Determining the number 
of iSNVs that transmit between hosts can also provide key information on the severity of the 
transmission bottleneck3, itself critical for understanding the ability of natural selection to shape 
patterns of genetic diversity.  
Finally, while large-scale EBOV sequence studies have now been undertaken in human 
populations, there is an evident and critical need to determine the ecology and evolution of 
EBOV in its animal reservoir(s). While most current data points to bats being the ultimate 
reservoir host34,35, long-term studies of EBOV in bats have yet to be performed and it is likely 
that other host species exist, which may have a major bearing on epidemiological dynamics. To 
truly understand the ecology and evolution of EBOV, as well as its mechanisms of pathogenicity, 
will require information on the virus in all its host-virus interactions, and not just those 
associated with EVD outbreaks in humans. 
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Tables 
Study Platform Method Sequencing location Case location # Seqs 
Baize S et al. N Engl J Med. 2014 Apr Sanger Amplified International Guinea 3 
Gire SK et al. Science. 2014 Sep Illumina Direct International Sierra Leone 79 
Hoenen T et al. Science. 2015 Apr Sanger Amplified International Mali 4 
Bell A et al. Euro Surveill. 2015 May Illumina Direct International UK 3 
Park DJ et al. Cell. 2015 Jun Illumina Direct International Sierra Leone 232 
Kugelman JR et al. Emerg Infect Dis. 2015 Jul Illumina Direct In-country / Liberia Liberia 25 
Simon-Loriere E et al. Nature. 2015 Aug Illumina Direct International Guinea 85 
Carroll MW et al. Nature. 2015 Aug Illumina Direct International Guinea/Liberia 179 
Tong YG et al. Nature. 2015 Aug BGISEQ-100 Amplified ? Sierra Leone 175 
Smits et al. Euro Surveil. 2015 Sep Ion Torrent Amplified In-country / Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 49 
Ladner JT et al. Cell Host Microbe. 2015 Dec Illumina Direct International Liberia 140 
Quick J et al. Nature. 2016 Feb MinION Amplified In-country / Guinea Guinea 137 
Hoenen T et al. Emerg Infect Dis. 2016 Feb MinION Amplified In-country / Liberia Liberia 8 
Arias et al Virus Evolution 2016 Jun Ion Torrent Amplified In-country / Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 554 
Table 1 | Overview over EBOV sequencing studies performed during the 2013-2016 
epidemic. 
Summary of the different sequencing efforts performed during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic 
noting sequencing platform. We include the following parameters for each study: method (Direct 
= no PCR amplification/enrichment; Amplified = material amplified via amplicon-based PCR 
prior to viral sequencing), sequencing location, country of origin for the sequenced samples (case 
location), and number of EBOV genomes produced. 
 
  
Figures 
Figure 1 | Evolution of EBOV during the 2013-2106 outbreak showing the extent and 
location of virus sampling.  
(a) Sampling during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic. Sequencing efforts closely match confirmed 
and suspected case numbers in each administrative division of Guinea (green), Liberia (red) and 
Sierra Leone (blue) (Spearman correlation coefficient = 0.91). (b) Map of the three countries 
most affected by EVD during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic. Administrative divisions in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are shown in green, red and blue, respectively, and colored according to 
the cumulative numbers of confirmed and suspected cases throughout the epidemic. Hatched 
areas indicate divisions that never reported any cases. The boundary data for the maps is from 
GADM (http://www.gadm.org). (c) Temporal phylogeny of all publicly available EBOV 
genomes estimated using BEAST97. Three lineages identified in previous studies2,21,25 are 
marked with colored backgrounds. The sequence alignment was partitioned into 4 categories: 
codon positions 1, 2 and 3, and non-coding intergenic regions. Changes in each of the 4 
partitions were modelled according to the HKY+Γ4 nucleotide substitution model with relative 
rates between partitions. Tip dates were used to calibrate a relaxed molecular clock with rates 
drawn from a lognormal distribution54 with an uninformative prior placed on the mean of the 
distribution. A flexible ‘skygrid’ tree prior was used to allow for changes in effective population 
sizes over time. Each tip is colored according to the country where the patient was most likely 
infected: green for Guinea, red for Liberia and blue for Sierra Leone. All panels are current as of 
April 19th, 2016. 
Figure 2 | Evolutionary rates of EBOV compared to those of other RNA viruses. 
(a) Estimates of evolutionary rate in diverse RNA viruses. Green points at the top indicate the 
mean evolutionary rates estimated for EBOV during the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic from 
different studies, with dashed lines showing the 95% credible intervals derived from BEAST 
analyses. Points at the bottom represent equivalent estimates (without uncertainty intervals) 
published previously for negative-sense single-strand RNA viruses (red), positive-sense single-
strand RNA viruses (blue) and double-strand RNA viruses (purple)72. Points colored the same 
shade belong to the same family. Evolutionary rate estimates for EBOV Makona occupy a 
narrow distribution within the range of rates observed in RNA viruses as a whole. (b) 95% 
credible intervals for the distribution of evolutionary rates for EBOV from the 2013-2016 EVD 
epidemic published previously. *An erratum98 revised the mean evolutionary rate estimate for 
Ref.17 to 1.32 x 10-3 [95% credible intervals: 0.89, 1.75 x 10-3] subs/site/year. 
Figure 3 | Examples of violations of the Ebola virus molecular clock. 
(a) Root-to-tip regression of genetic distances against time (month and year) of sampling for 105 
representative EBOV variant sequences collected between 1976 and 2016 based on a maximum 
likelihood tree. (b) Equivalent root-to-tip regression of publicly available sequences from the 
2013-2016 EVD epidemic utilizing data on the day of sampling, and the maximum likelihood 
tree on which the estimates were made. RAxML99 (panel A) and PhyML100 (panel B) were used 
to find the maximum likelihood phylogenies under an HKY+Γ4 substitution model which was 
rooted via least squares regression in TempEst. Substitutions accumulate linearly with time, with 
some variation. Sequences recovered from transmission events that occurred as a result of 
persistent EBOV infection often exhibit temporal anomalies. In this scenario, EBOV may 
accumulate substitutions at a lower rate during persistence in individuals compared to regular 
person-to-person transmission. Larger red points indicate sequences of EBOV sampled from 
EVD survivor-associated transmission chains76,77. 
Box 1 Figure | Different measures of genome sequence change. 
Mutations accumulate with time. This phenomenon is at the core of molecular clocks, a class of 
methods that aim to convert molecular phylogenies with branch lengths given in expected 
substitutions per site into plausible temporal phylogenies where branch lengths are given in time 
units and the trees themselves are embedded in time. By making use of sequences sampled at 
different times, such methods can estimate the evolutionary rate that provides the conversion 
from genetic distance into time. As phylogenetic methods have become ever more powerful and 
easily accessible, confusion has resulted from the frequent and interchangeable use of the terms 
mutation rate and substitution rate to signify the ‘molecular clock’ rate. Mutation and 
substitution rates, however, sit on the opposite ends of the evolutionary rate continuum and 
neither is the appropriate term for the molecular clock rate derived from densely sequenced 
epidemics. 
Concept Explanation “holmes
_figure
_box.pd
f” 
Mutation rate As viruses replicate, mutational errors are incorporated into the viral 
genome. The mutation rate is therefore typically expressed as the 
number of mutations per site, per replication event. The mutation rate 
for RNA viruses such as EBOV is largely determined by the viral 
RNA-dependent RNA polymerase, which lacks proof-reading activity. 
The estimation of mutation rates requires complex sequencing-based 
or phenotypic marker experiments that correct for the impact of 
natural selection79. Mutation rates are unknown for most viruses and 
have not been determined for EBOV, although it would be predicted 
to be comparable to other (-)ssRNA viruses and likely similar across 
all EBOV outbreak variants. 
Evolutionary rate The evolutionary rate of a virus can be defined as the observed rate at 
which new variants arise and spread in the viral population as the 
result of a complex interplay of natural selection, genetic drift, modes 
of transmission and epidemiological processes. This can be measured 
by methods that compare the genetic change in viral genomes 
collected at different times. Importantly, evolutionary rates in RNA 
viruses may be dependent on the time-scale over which they are 
measured: they are elevated in the short-term, such as within disease 
outbreaks, because mildly deleterious mutations may not have been 
eliminated by purifying selection71,72.  
Substitution rate The substitution rate is best described as the long-term rate at which 
genetic variants become fixed in a virus lineage over evolutionary 
time-scales, such as between human outbreaks in the case of EBOV. 
This rate will usually be lower than the short-term evolutionary rate, 
because many of the variants circulating within outbreaks and 
epidemics will ultimately be eliminated. Furthermore, saturation – 
repeated changes at the same site – will further reduce the measured 
substitution rate.  
Fixation rate An added complexity in estimating rates in RNA viruses is that the 
population genetic concept of ‘fixation’, central to the definition of 
substitution, is ill-defined. In slowly evolving organisms fixation 
events can usually be distinguished from polymorphisms by analysing 
individual nucleotide sites within and between species. However, in 
rapidly evolving RNA viruses fixation can be described to occur (1) at 
the level of individual hosts over the course of infection, (2) in viral 
lineages within specific geographic locations or epidemiological 
networks (such as the different lineages of EBOV generated during 
the 2013-2016 EVD epidemic), (3) in global meta-populations, and 
(4) between different viral species. 
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